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Afghanistan has experienced close to four decades of perpetual violence wars, political 
upheavals, and religious and ethnic clashes, resulting in millions of Afghans fleeing to 
neighbouring countries for protection. Facing the Soviet invasion after the Saur revolution and 
the ensuing civil conflict, between 1979 and the early 1990s approximately [1] six million 
escaped to Pakistan and Iran, marking the first exodus of Afghan refugees. After Soviet forces 
withdrew from Afghanistan, around two million refugees decided to return to their country. 
However, beginning in the mid-1990s, factional clashes led to an outbreak of civil war and the 
rise of the Taliban, who were able to gain control of major areas and ensued by the 
establishment of an extraordinary cruel autocratic terror regime. The widespread violations of 
human and fundamental rights at the hands of the Taliban, and the on-going military conflict 
with armed oppositional forces (especially in the North of the country with the United Islamic 
Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, popular known as the Northern Alliance, led to new 
waves of refugees. The US-led military intervention in late 2001 against the Taliban regime 
initially caused further displacement. However, the engagement of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) after the downfall of the Taliban regime, and the establishment of 
the Afghan Interim Administration (after 2002 Afghan Transitional Administration) of Hamid 
Karzai following the 2001 Bonn agreement aroused hope for peaceful and socio-economic 
prospects. In result, some 5.7 million Afghan refugees returned home, almost one quarter of 
the entire population. Nevertheless, during the last decades Afghans not only turned into the 
largest global refugee population but also created one of the world’s longest refugee 
situations. This changed only last year, with the upsurge in violence in Iraq and as the Islamic 
State (Daesh) started its ‘Jihadist genocide’ in Syria and the local multi-dimensional armed 
conflicts reached a regional unprecedented level of intensity and brutality. However, the fact 
that today the Afghans cease to be the greatest refugee community does not indicate an 
improvement of their situation. The ‘Costs of War project’ of the Watson Institute at the 
Brown University and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) stated 
recently that Afghanistan still remains the world’s second largest source of refugees: in 2014, 
with more than 3.7 million as of July 2014, 700,000-plus of which are internally displaced 
persons (IDPs). 
This pertinent issue raises some crucial questions: First, why again has an extraordinary huge 
number of Afghans decided to flee their country? Second, what steps does the Afghan 
government and the international community need to take to stop even more Afghans from 
leaving their country? 
Basically there are several mutually enforcing reasons that sum up why Afghans are again 
entering the refugees trail in a large scale. 
First, Afghanistan suffers from a sharply deteriorating security situation. This is mainly due to 
the massive return of the Taliban and the expanding activities of ISIS and other Jihadist 
groups, which led to a tremendous increase in terrorist attacks causing several civilian 
casualties. 
Secondly, there is a rising influence of Islamic fundamentalist clerics in state and society, 
pushing towards Islamization and the eradication of all achievements made in the last decade 
in terms of Women and Girls’ rights, Human/Fundamental rights and the general situation of 
civil society. 
Thirdly, the people are disenchanted about the democratic and economic performance of the 
country. Those in control of Afghanistan since October 2001, namely the US-backed Kabul 
elite, have failed to establish an inclusive, legitimate and accountable political system. Instead 
the country’s democratic transition and state-building process were featured by the return of 
autocratic, decentralised warlord rule, high level of tolerance for impunity regarding war 
crimes, pervasive corruption, torture and other human rights’ violations as well as the 
exclusion or marginalization of certain, disadvantaged communities. Especially the corrupt 
and nepotistic governments of former President Hamid Karzai truncated and violated any 
notions and fundamental principles of ‘liberal democracy’. Additionally the remarkable 
uncertainty and heightened risk of tensions over the election period in 2014 convinced many 
refugees not to return to Afghanistan and was an incentive for people inside the country to 
leave . 
Fourthly, Western engagement in the country produced a new generation of Afghans, which 
are not only skilled and educated, but also socio-politically much more aware. Inspired by the 
new potential opportunities, these Afghans have high hopes for a better life and high 
expectations with regards to an economic, social and politically prosperous Afghanistan, free 
of past shackles. Subsequently, Afghans are not only deeply afraid but also very disappointed 
about socio-political and economic prospects of the country. In other words, the people fear a 
fall back into the erstwhile living conditions as suffered under the Taliban regime. 
Fifthly, the fact that more and more areas are under control of the Jihadists which shows 
clearly the fruitlessness of peace negotiations determines additional worries of the Afghan 
people. The Afghan government’s willingness to continue the peace negotiations (despite all 
former failures) with the Taliban is making Afghans extremely insecure. Here, it seems that 
Pakistan’s government and especially its security agents are continuing their traditional 
support for the Taliban. This will make it even more complicated for the Afghan armed forces 
-which achieved some success in fighting the Taliban (and other militant groups) but are still 
nascent and insufficiently equipped- to guarantee security. 
Sixthly, it became increasingly clear that the transfer of power from the NATO/ISAF to 
Afghan authorities looks rather like shirking than shifting of responsibilities. By having said 
that, one can identify much frustration among the people that the new government has no 
capacities to improve the security situation and no political will to reduce the influence of the 
fundamentalist Islamic clerics in the political-administrative state structure. 
Seventhly, it is important to be aware of the situation of internally displaced persons and of 
Afghan refugees in neighbouring countries is severely deteriorating. In this context, one must 
mention that Iran still has more than 950.000 registered refugees (and 1.4 million 
undocumented ones) and Pakistan continues to host around 1.5 million registered refugees 
(and estimated 1.5 million undocumented ones). Since early this year, it seems that both 
countries are no longer willing to accept this tremendous amount of migrants. Pakistan and 
Iran started to expel thousands of refugees (since January 2015 around 130.000 from Pakistan 
and around 200,000 from Iran) and have pushed them back into Afghanistan. This is gaining 
importance, because 5.8 million Afghans have already returned to their country under the 
Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR), turning the general economic opportunities 
for returnees and IDPs in Afghanistan from bad to worse. Consequently, additional returnees 
from Iran and Pakistan will further aggravate the already extremely tense ‘domestic refugee 
situation’ in Afghanistan. After returning to Afghanistan, the returnees (and the IDPs) find 
themselves in meagre and hopeless living conditions determined by war, poverty, 
malnourishment [2], and lawlessness. Most of the migrants are unable to go back to their 
original place of origin and are often doomed to languish in informal settlements, where many 
people have died due to cold and illness combined with insufficient access to basic healthcare. 
In order to escape from this environment that is hostile to life, the voluntary returnees as well 
as the ‘deported’ ones from Pakistan and Iran will lead add to and increase the refugee 
movement to Europe. 
It is interesting to note, that the SSAR is a voluntary return programme initiated by the 
Afghan, Pakistani, and Iranian governments and launched in 2002 with the assistance of the 
UNHCR. In order to secure the funding for this scheme, all three governments “agreed to 
work towards providing a minimum standard of living and livelihood opportunities for 
returnees and towards preserving asylum space for refugees, among other things“. Since its 
implementation, the SSAR constitutes the main regional policy framework for sustainable 
reintegration of refugees returning to Afghanistan. However, it seems that the SSAR did not 
help at all to change the mind-set and practice of Pakistani and Iranian authorities towards 
Afghan refugees ‘informal deportation’ and or facing harsh treatments. Against this backdrop, 
UNHCR estimates that there are approximately 23,000 deaths among Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan each year [3]. 
Finally, against the backdrop of the dramatic situation of the refugees trying to enter Europe 
as well as the internally displaced persons who are on the edge to leave the country, it is 
extremely crucial to deal with the puzzle of necessary steps that need to be taken in order to 
stop the exodus of Afghan people. 
From a short-term perspective, there is not much the government of President Ashraf Ghani 
and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah can do to stop the speedy flight of the 
Afghans from the country. However, it must work towards the fulfillment of its agreed 
international conventions, especially, regarding human rights, protection of women, and civil 
society organizations. These commitments were mostly ignored by the Karzai 
administrations, which added to the lack of trust of the people in the government and gave 
Jihadists much room to entrench their influence in the country. In this direction, the Afghan 
government needs to take a much harder stand to protect the constitution as well as to ensure 
the rule of law, and spend much more effort to contain the influence of the Islamists within 
state and society. 
Against this backdrop, it is also clear that peace with the Taliban is not possible and that they 
are not willing to accept any democratic principles or procedures. Therefore, the 
administration should stop any negotiations with the Taliban, which adds to the fear of the 
people about the Taliban seizing more power, outside as well as inside the state structure. The 
recent announcement that the international leadership dispute within the Afghan Taliban 
movement is solved led to more concerns than creating hope for a substantial peace process. 
Last but not least, the Afghan government with the support of the international community 
especially, China, which developed over the last years a keen interest in Afghan domestic 
politics, must come to an agreement with Islamabad to stop the intimidation of Afghan 
refugees to force them out of the country. A potential way forward in this direction is that the 
Government of Pakistan continues to grant Afghan refugees the Proof of Registration (PoR) 
cards (temporary visa) issued by the National Database and Registration Authority (Nadra). 
Since the validity of the PoR cards are always restricted to two years, and extension is not 
guaranteed , this could lead to an extreme increase of deportations. In this context, it will be 
significant to convince Islamabad to extend the PoR cards. Here, the Afghan government was 
already successfully active and negotiated with Pakistan the extension of the validity of PoR 
cards from the end of 2015 until December 31, 2017. It is of utmost importance that this 
positive trend continues and that Pakistan’s authorities will maintain the instrument of PoR to 
give refugees a legal status and to control the flow of migrants and to reduce the refugee 
pressure on Afghanistan. Nevertheless, despite the PoR cards, intimidation or the threat that 
refugee camps might be shut down is accelerating the flow of refugees from Pakistan to 
Afghanistan. 
Furthermore, the new Washington-Tehran rapprochement should be utilized to convince Iran 
to loosen its tough rules to discourage more arrival of refugees while pressurizing their 
current refugees to leave the country. In this context, the UNHCR should strictly apply the 
conditions of its SSAR. The violations of the notion of voluntary repatriation[4] possess the 
imminent threat that this repatriation scheme is supporting the anti-refugee practices of 
Islamabad and Tehran. In other words, the refugees are forcefully cast out from their host 
countries without ensuring their sufficient protection and sustainable reintegration in 
Afghanistan, making any successful implementation of SSAR initiatives impossible. The 
UNHCR clearly states that ‘voluntariness‘ means the “absence of measures which push the 
refugee to repatriate”. Furthermore, the host countries (like Iran and Pakistan) are “bound by 
the fundamental principle of non-refoulement not to return refugees in any manner 
whatsoever to territories, or to the frontiers of territories, where their life or freedom would be 
threatened”. In the given context, an increase of ‘returning refugees’ would worsen the overall 
situation for internally displaced persons in Afghanistan and subsequently enforcing the 
exodus of Afghans. 
Finally, besides the severe bureaucratic problems for Afghans in Pakistan and Iran, also in 
Afghanistan all types of refugees have to suffer from ominous challenges created by the 
country’s authorities. Foremost, the Afghan Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MORR) 
[5], has been plagued by corruption, nepotism, forgery and lack of capacities. In consequence, 
despite international assistance MORR is unable to make significant progress towards an 
improvement of the socio-economic conditions. Subsequently the Afghan government has 
failed to implement any crucial domestic initiative, like the urgent redistribution of land to 
returnees, or the establishment of an adequate legal framework for refugees. 
In sum one must state, that besides efforts of the international community and some attempts 
of local governments not one of the core components of voluntary repatriation, as defined by 
the UNHCT has been adequately matched, namely physical, legal and material safety, and 
reconciliation. Thus, the Afghan refugees’ crisis will rather intensify than calm down; leading 
to an increase of refugees, from the East to West. 
Notes 
[1] There are no independent confirmed data available regarding the numbers of refugees in 
Pakistan and Iran available. 
[2] According to a 2012 report by the Feinstein International Center, one in three Afghan 
children are malnourished, with rates far higher in conflict-affected regions. 
[3] In contrast, Pakistani authorities reported only nine total deaths among Afghan refugees 
from January 2008 through June 2014. 
[4] Voluntary repatriation, as defined in UNHRC Handbook for Voluntary Repatriation: 
International Protection and the UNHCR’s Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration 
Activities (2004), entails a process beginning with return and the restoration of national 
protection and culminating, through the reintegration’ process, in the ability of returnees to 
maintain sustainable livelihoods, access basic services and fully reintegrate into communities 
and countries of origin. 
[5] This ministry main task is to coordinate refugee and returnee affairs with other ministries 
and international organizations. 
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